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The Logic of Trade Integration and Its 
Shortcomings
Regional integration has a major role to play in ex-
panding trading capacities and facilitating competi-
tion and innovation. With the elimination of market-
access barriers, the driving force is the increase in 
trade within regions rather than across them. The 
concern, in particular in relation to the European re-
gion (or bloc), is asymmetry in comparative advan-
tages and disparity in the economic and social size of 
the two regions and within each region.
How important is trade among Mediterranean coun-
tries? How important are the disparities and asym-
metries? How relevant is the level of openness within 
and across the region? 
The Barcelona Process is the central instrument for 
Euro-Mediterranean relations. Initially, 27 parties 
were involved: 15 European Members and 10 South-
ern and Eastern Mediterranean States (plus Cyprus 
and Malta before joining the EU). Launched in No-
vember 1995, the Process aimed to establish a com-
mon area of peace, stability and prosperity in the 
Mediterranean. It represented an innovative alliance 
based on the principles of “joint ownership, dialogue 
and cooperation” in several areas, including econom-
ic and social integration within a Euro-Mediterranean 
free trade area (EMFTA) by 2010. 
With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the logic 
and scope of the original institutional framework be-
came unsustainable. One could say that the Process 
was derailed by a series of internal and external caus-
es. The number of EU members grew to 27, and two 
new members joined the Mediterranean countries 
(Albania and Mauritania) to make a total of 39 parties 
involved following the introduction of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Other causes are more political and institutional. A 
parliamentary dimension was added in March 2004, 
while the Agadir Agreement of the same year was 
instrumental in reinforcing economic integration and 
supporting the gradual implementation of the EM-
FTA. In 2005, a migration chapter was added as a 
fourth key policy area of the partnership, which 
served more to raise expectations than create effec-
tive results. In July 2008, the agreements on the Un-
ion for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the extension to 
five southeast European non-member states and the 
creation of the Secretariat in Barcelona tried to re-
launch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
Although the goal of EMFTA was not reached, the 
benefits for the SEM countries (southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean) were consistent, as was predicted by 
the economic literature: greater openness, growth in 
income and employment and growing expectations 
for a better future [Baldwin and Venables (2004), 
Sideri (2001); FEMISE (2010)].
The Outcomes: a Second-Best Solution
It is well known among economists that trade pat-
terns and comparative advantages are influenced by 
many factors, including the endowment of resources, 
institutional factors related to commercial policies 
and incentives provided to economic agents and in-
stitutions. All these factors were part of joint and bi-
lateral negotiations during the various stages of the 
Barcelona Process. As a ‘second-best’ solution, 
the outcomes were never going to be ideal for either 
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side. Some partners retained a dominant position as 
oil and gas exporters, which protected them from 
competition. Other partners, however, have similar 
factor endowments and consequent comparative ad-
vantages, both for industrial and agricultural prod-
ucts, making the Partnership very sensitive, particu-
larly in the short term, as it exposes the domestic 
producers to greater competition from each other. 
Preferential Access
The Association Agreements and Action Plans cov-
ered a broad range of issues going well beyond trade, 
including not only commercial preferences, but more 
substantial and specific economic incentives and do-
mestic reforms. The validity of this approach has been 
confirmed by numerous empirical studies that explore 
the effects of a tariff, or its non-tariff equivalent, reduc-
tion. First of all the agreements have offered more op-
portunities to a greater variety of products (extensive 
effect) and differentiation; secondly the reduction of 
transactional costs and tariffs allowed an increase 
of volume and value of products already traded among 
partners (intensive effect). The empirical results have 
confirmed both effects: a decrease in concentration 
of products and an increase in trading volumes, which 
fosters trade integration. [Cipollina, M., Pietrovito, F. 
(2010); Jarreau J. (2011); Femise (2011)].
The Larger Openness
The deep-integration approach was instrumental in 
raising trade openness. Using as an indicator the 
trade-to-GDP ratio of the 10 SEMs,1 the index 
shows that these countries succeeded well in open-
ing their economies to international trade, but the 
geographical structure may be cause for concern.
For the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the out-
come is mixed, in particular for exports from SEMs to 
the EU. For example, Péridy (2007) finds that EU 
preferences led to a 20-27% increase in exports 
from Mediterranean countries over the period 1995-
2001, i.e. the period covering the first six years of the 
Barcelona Process. However, De Wulf and Malisze-
wska (2009) show that southern Mediterranean ex-
ports to the EU have increased by less than their 
1 Israel is not included, despite being a partner in the Barcelona Process, as it has economic, political and social features similar to those enjoyed 
by advanced countries.
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exports to the rest of the world. Both patterns are 
reported in Chart 1, which shows the openness ratio 
during the three phases of the Barcelona Process.
Taking advantage of EU preferences, SEM partners 
have built up a more competitive and diversified ex-
port capacity. The overall trade openness ratio rose 
significantly from 18% in 1995 to 28% in 2013. 
However, it can be observed that the significant con-
tributions to the openness created during the first 
phase of the EMP have not been sustained by the 
incentives offered within the ENP and UfM. Since 
2004, higher growth rates were achieved with extra-
regional partners offering more opportunities to di-
versify SEM trade flows, in particular in the Gulf area 
or outside. As of 2013, the share of total trade in 
GDP for SEM countries exposed to the EU 28 was 
significantly lower than the previous EMP period, 
where trade represented only 22% of the value of 
their GDP compared to more than 30% for the Rest 
of the World (RoW). (See Chart 1.)
Links through foreign investments typically played a 
prominent role on this performance, but not enough 
to explain what happened in the second decade of 
the Partnership. This review provides several fac-
tors: from higher integration through other preferen-
tial agreements between Arab countries, including 
the Agadir Agreement, which seems to have per-
formed reasonably well2, to narrower independent 
initiatives with large trading countries like India, Chi-
na and also Turkey (a partner in the Euro-Mediterra-
nean partnership).
Although an empirical literature has flourished on the 
technical issues of the agreements (preferences, 
length of negotiations) an important aspect cannot 
be neglected: the change of the competitive advan-
tages of the region as a consequence of the fifth 
enlargement of the EU and the simultaneous acces-
sion of the former Eastern Bloc. The effects were 
significant, as the enlargement and the consequent 
set-up of the ENP gradually eroded the preferences 
designed to foster trade and investment integration. 
Still the UfM initiative has fallen short of expecta-
tions. Mostly because of the financial crises between 
2008 and 2009, that shaped a significant drop in 
external trade, but ultimately due to the shortcom-
ings of its scope based on bilateral incentives. 
The evidence may suggest that EU preferences did 
have some success on the economic front, as trade 
and investments contributed to more openness and 
more diversification in their export flows. However 
the original design has shifted since 2004 to a more 
‘shallow’ integration, due to the complexity of the 
problems confronting the EU and its partners and 
the new conflicts within the region that have ham-
pered political and administrative reforms.
EMFTA remains a dream, an ideal 
aspiration challenged by other 
important international players, in 
particular the Arab Gulf countries, 
which need to invest and diversify 
their large financial surpluses
EMFTA remains a dream, an ideal aspiration chal-
lenged by other important international players, in 
particular the Arab Gulf countries, which need to in-
vest and diversify their large financial surpluses. Ulti-
mately, in this competitive geopolitical environment, 
the efficiency of the conditionality/preferential logic 
rests on a cost-benefit calculation of the governing 
elites of the SEM countries. Since there are costs 
associated to the structural reforms that comply with 
the implementation of the acquis communautaire, 
the elites of the region may choose to avoid them, 
preferring to redirect their trade flows to other more 
mercantilist partners. In the end, the strong export 
growth and FDI inflows have not been translated into 
similarly strong economic and social progress and 
the outcome has been disappointing. 
Product Concentration
Product concentration is another aspect of the asym-
metry and vulnerability of the Euro-Mediterranean in-
tegration. The concentration of SEM export flows3 is 
2 Among developing countries, the MENA countries have the highest preferential margin (RPM), which facilitates intraregional trade, at almost 5%, 
higher than South Asia (4% RPM) or Central Asia (about 1.8%). NICITA (2011).
3 Values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Concentration Index computed by UNCTAD as a measure of dispersion of trade value across the 
exporters’ products.
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well known, especially regarding natural resources or 
labour-intensive manufacturing. Particularly high val-
ues indicate the exporters’ dependency on few prod-
ucts or on few trading partners, but also the poten-
tially high benefits from the reduction of trade barriers. 
Moreover, diversification helps to mitigate the effects 
of negative trade shocks especially when product va-
rieties and foreign markets are not perfectly correlat-
ed and the negative shocks in some areas may be 
offset by positive shocks in others. 
Measured over time, as in Chart 2 and 3, a fall in the 
index is an indication of greater diversification in 
the SEM’s export structure. Two decades of Medi-
terranean cooperation reveals that product differen-
tiation based on comparative advantages increased 
in most countries in the region. There are, however, 
some differences when we compare the concentra-
tion of SEM exports to both EU and Arab countries 
of the MENA region. The GAFTA preference system 
seems to be more generous than the EMFTA, as the 
level of concentration, although decreasing, remains 
higher for Tunisian, Egyptian or Jordanian exports to 
the EU, compared to a more diversified structure 
when trading with the MENA countries. 
The economic transformations have gone in the right 
direction, reducing disparities and creating new op-
portunities. Additional benefits from this process are 
the result of the industrial relocation of European en-
terprises, creating new sectors that sustained the 
positive relationship between export growth and di-
versity. In addition, the evidence confirms that greater 
diversification stabilises export earnings and gener-
ates positive spillovers and externalities for competi-
tion and employment. [Alessandrini S. (2014)]. (See 
Chart 1 and Chart 2.)
Geographical Differences
The traditional division into four sub-regional groups 
has not changed. One could say that the ‘hub-and-
spoke’ approach has reinforced this feature with new 
priorities and geopolitical preferences. Excluding Tur-
key and Israel for their specific policy aspirations and 
size, the southern-eastern divide of the Mediterranean 
region has been strengthened. Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon have promoted comprehensive reform pro-
grammes and have achieved more progress in inte-
gration with Arab countries and some Asian econo-
mies, while Morocco and Tunisia have made important 
steps toward greater trade integration with the EU.
The European Union remains the main trading part-
ner for five of the 11 countries participating in the 
Barcelona initiative. Europe 28 receives more than 
CHART 2 Concentration of Exports to EU27
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40% of their total exports. Two of them are major oil 
exporters (Algeria and Libya) and three are tradition-
al partners (Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). Exclud-
ing the oil producers, the other partners indicate a 
gradual diversification to other industrial countries 
(benefitting from preferential treatment or FTA) or to 
the Gulf region. The most notable change here is the 
decrease in Egypt’s export share. In 2013, the Euro-
pean Union accounted for just 29.3% of its exports 
compared to 54.5% in 1995 and 36.5% in 2008. 
This diversification is very significant and confirms 
the greater attraction for the Arab partners, which 
accounted for 32% of Egyptian exports in 2013, re-
flecting the overall extra-regional orientation of this 
country, despite the Agadir Agreement.
On a more disaggregated level one can also ob-
serve the change of the EU’s perception and com-
mitment to the Mediterranean Partnership. The di-
rection of trade, in particular SEM exports to Europe, 
has changed over the course of the last 20 years 
due to new geopolitical priorities among the SEM 
partners, as well as changing interests among Euro-
pean importers. Chart 4 shows the share of MED 10 
exports to the five major European partners (Italy, 
France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain). 
From the beginning of the partnership, Italy and Ger-
many were the two main export destinations for the 
region (more than 20% each), with France in an in-
termediate position and Spain and United Kingdom 
in a more secluded location (less than 10% each). 
The degree of concentration was thus very high, with 
an absorption of the other 23 European countries of 
only one fifth of the EU’s imports.
The evidence is certainly consistent with the idea that, 
during the first decade of the partnership, Germany 
gradually fell into an intermediate position in MED 10 
exports, despite its stronger integration with Turkey, 
which acts as a gateway for investors and exporters 
to reach parts of the Middle East and Mediterranean. 
The second notable trend is the increased interest 
and orientation of Spain and the United Kingdom with 
growing market shares. The French position is partly 
aligned with German interests, before recovering po-
sitions and voice during the ENP and after proposing 
the creation of the UfM. Exports from SEM countries 
suffered after 2009 not only because of the drop in oil 
prices, but also due to the contraction of European 
domestic demand. Italy maintained its leading posi-
tion as the main destination, although its market share 
declined almost 5 percentage points between 2009 
and 2013, while the shares of Spain and the United 
Kingdom continued to perform more robustly. 
Considering that the enlargement of the European 
market after 2004 did not create favourable condi-
CHART 3 Concentration of Exports to MENA 19
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tions for further integration between the two shores 
of the Mediterranean, it is worth noting the exception 
of Turkey: its share of total EU imports increased 
along with its role as a Euro-Asian and Mediterra-
nean gateway that enjoyed growing bilateral ex-
changes with SEM countries. 
The initial distribution of trade flows, among top im-
porters and small niche countries, is now converging 
to a more diversified shape. These features underline 
an alternative interpretation of the Euro-Mediterrane-
an Partnership; despite the poor results in encourag-
ing greater integration between the two regions and 
inability to prevent contrasts and tensions in South-
ern Europe, the ENP has offered the legitimisation for 
more (un-balanced) economic relations to the central 
and northern countries of Europe, so that their cumu-
lated share of MED 11 exports absorbs a quarter of 
European imports (up from 20% at the end of the 
nineties). (See Chart 4.)
Weak Interregional Integration
If the ambitions are to stimulate sustainable develop-
ment in SEM countries the ‘hub-and-spoke’ integra-
tion approach revealed quite controversial difficul-
ties for the partners on the eastern shore.
Chart 5 shows the trade links among the southern 
and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Basin. 
The degree of integration is measured by the share 
of exports, which is very low; well below its poten-
tial. The subregions are under-traded in particular 
for the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) and North Af-
rica (which includes Egypt and Libya) with an ex-
port value of less than 5% of total exports. Some 
positive changes can be observed after 2004, in-
cluding an increase in intra-regional exports, which 
is particularly promising for the AMU, and the dou-
bling of the index value from 2004 and 2013. This 
is very different to the expansion of trade with 
the MENA 19: the integration index reached 20% 
of total exports in 2013 from 12% in 1995. (See 
Chart 5.)
The evidence is clear: integration forces and trade 
liberalisation are supported by an extra-regional 
model which is less ambitious. Several features are 
shared by most of these countries. Tariff barriers 
were gradually reduced over the two decades, while 
non-tariff barriers and rules of origins were eased 
with the application of the cumulative rules of origin 
specifically stated within the Agadir Agreement and 
GAFTA. The progress has been slow and the region 
remains economically divided, with the lowest level 
of intra-regional trade and economic integration 
CHART 4 MED 10 to EU 28: Percentages
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compared to other regional arrangements. Non-tariff 
barriers and rules of origin continue to distort relative 
prices and restrict trade within the SEM region, as 
emphasised by Augier et al. (2013) and Ghoneim 
(2012). The second impediment is the concentra-
tion of their exports and their substitutability, which 
restrict specialisation and further trade. Thirdly, the 
lack of integrative infrastructures and facilities, in-
cluding poor and corrupt administrations, increases 
cross-border costs.
Growing Trade Imbalances
Among the risks introduced by the Euro-Mediterra-
nean policies, the economic literature has reported 
the increased trade deficit caused by the disman-
tling of trade barriers. The ex-post evidence shows a 
quite different evolution, in part due to the dynamics 
of oil prices. The partner countries differ considera-
bly: on the one hand, two countries are oil exporters 
that accumulated significant surpluses over the two 
decades; the other partners have been able to man-
age a bilateral deficit that has never exceeded the 
sustainability level, as the merchandise trade deficit 
has been compensated by non-trade elements of 
services and private transfers, specifically tourism 
and remittances. 
Turkey is a special case, as it changed its focus from 
an import-substitution system to an outward-orient-
ed growth one. The trade deficit was sustained for a 
long time with non-trade surplus flows. However, the 
multidimensional characters of the current global cri-
ses had a negative effect on its exports, so that since 
2010 Turkey shows an average trade deficit with the 
EU of over $20 billion per year.
However, it is equally interesting to observe the 
changes in the EU’s bilateral trade balances. The tra-
ditional trade deficit of SEM countries and the relat-
ed dichotomy shaping Europe’s external relations 
worsened from 2004 to 2008: Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom remained net importers of energy 
products and generated a growing deficit due to 
high oil prices and the growth of their economies. 
Soon after their economies went into recession in 
2009, trade deficit fell sharply to lower levels. The 
exception is the UK that continued to run consistent 
deficits with the region. 
Across the other European countries, exchanges 
generated a surplus that, for the large exporters, did 
not exceed $5 billion annually. What is interesting to 
observe is the growing neo-mercantilist propensity 
to accumulate trade surpluses from the Central Eu-
ropean countries (over $14 billion in 2013), that led 
to a move away from the spirit of the initial agree-
ment inspired by the principles of shared prosperity, 
CHART 5 Intra-Regional Integration*
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joint ownership (i.e. jointly-defined policy) and com-
mon development. 
Not surprisingly, the outcome of the UfM was the 
increase of the bilateral trade surplus of Germany 
and 23 other countries (here aggregated in Chart 6), 
compensating the trade deficit of the three countries 
of the southern littoral. This may be justified by the 
export market diversification of the SEM countries 
underlined above, but it also reflects the diverging 
trends within EU countries. Of course, these pat-
terns may not be interpreted as the sole consequence 
of the UfM partnership agreements, but certainly op-
pose the abstract concepts of integration and soli-
darity among countries, and contrast with the mer-
cantilist approach of the economic agents when 
they enter the international markets. These recent 
patterns demand an explanation, since they reveal 
the nature of the market that has been established 
on the northern shore of the Euro-Mediterranean re-
gion: it strengthens the ‘hub-and-spoke’ logic and 
weakens the growth potential. This is a direct con-
trast with the original aims, namely, to use the bilat-
eral and regional (South-South) trade to strengthen 
the potential for growth, differentiate production and 
create an integrated regional area.
Conclusions
SEM countries need to create millions of jobs in or-
der to accommodate the rapid expansion of the la-
bour force in the region. The problem today is the 
sense of frustration emerging from the results of 20 
years of regional integration: low per-capita GDP 
growth, growing employment problems, undocu-
mented migration and still higher tariffs that are twice 
those of the emerging economies. The Euro-Medi-
terranean project has changed its character and has 
become increasingly fragmented, while the South-
South integration through GAFTA and the Agadir 
Process remains weighed down by a lack of political 
commitment and serious structural impediments. 
Despite its economic crisis, Europe should continue 
to open its own markets to products from the region. 
Europe should also realise that the initial proposal to 
create a free trade zone in the wider Mediterranean 
area has failed, but that the actual bilateral approach 
in negotiating with partner countries is not a win-win 
solution. It reinforces a core-periphery approach 
rather than sustaining a true and sustainable region-
wide integration among the SEM countries. We may 
expect these initiatives to send the right signals to 
CHART 6 MED 10 Regional Balance: Growing Disparities
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encourage trade openness -the goal- and identify 
the measures which are needed to give these coun-
tries prospects for economic progress. The Arab 
springs of 2011 and today’s migration flows have 
made it increasingly clear that the region has a po-
tential of young and educated citizens; they are ask-
ing for opportunities, they need policies and per-
spectives of social and inclusive development. The 
resistance to modernisation, the timid reforms, often 
late in their enforcement, all contribute to reducing 
opportunities and sustaining instability. 
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